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Punishing Infanticide in the Irish Free State 
 
Dr. Karen Brennan*1 
 
This article explores sentencing of women convicted of infanticide offences at the Central 
Criminal Court between 1922 and 1949. A sample of 124 cases involving women who had 
been convicted of manslaughter, concealment of birth, or child abandonment/child 
cruelty, after appearing at the Central Criminal Court on a charge of murdering their 
newly or recently born infant, is examined. The sentences imposed in this sample mainly 
include short prison terms, suspended prison sentences, and conditional 
discharges/probation. It will be argued that the limited use of imprisonment, particularly 
in cases involving manslaughter convictions, indicates that Irish judges took a lenient 
approach to sentencing in cases of maternal infanticide. The court records show that a 
notable aspect of sentencing practice in these Irish infanticide cases is the use of non-
penal religious institutions, mostly convents, as an alternative to traditional custody. The 
impact of patriarchal ideologies and pragmatic considerations on sentencing practice in 
cases of infanticide is explored, particularly in regard to the use of religious institutions. 
One of the questions considered is whether the approach to sentencing women convicted 
of infanticide offences was a unique product of the patriarchal, conservative, catholic, and 
nationalist philosophies of the Irish Free State, or whether sentencing practice in these 
cases reflects wider trends in the response to female criminality which have been 
identified elsewhere. 
 
I - Introduction 
 
During the first decades of Irish independence, the killing of an infant with malice 
aforethought was murder and, thus, punishable by death. The Irish legislature adopted the 
English approach to maternal infant-murder (hereinafter infanticide) when it enacted the 
Infanticide Act 1949.2  This article considers the criminal justice response to maternal 
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1 The Irish Free State was established by the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. The Treaty led to the partition of 
Ireland, with the creation of a 26-county Free State, an autonomous dominion within the British Empire. The 
Free State was declared a fully independent republic in 1949 by virtue of the Republic of Ireland Act 1948 (and 
the Republic of Ireland Act (Commencement Order) 1949); the Republic of Ireland was granted recognition by 
Britain in the Ireland Act 1949. See generally F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, 2nd ed. (London: Fontana, 
1973) at 421-570. 
2 The term “infanticide” is used in this article in a non-legal sense to refer to cases where women were charged 
with the murder of their infants aged under one year. This reflects the current legal definition of the term. 
“Infanticide” was not made a specific offence in Ireland until the enactment of the Infanticide Act 1949 
[hereinafter 1949 Act]. This statute created the offence of infanticide, a homicide offence akin to manslaughter 
in terms of its seriousness, punishable by a maximum sentence of penal servitude for life, and triable at the 
Circuit Criminal Court. Sections 1(2) and (3) of the 1949 Act provided that infanticide would be available as a 
charge or a conviction, where the woman had “by any wilful act or omission caused the death of her child”, in 
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infanticide in Ireland prior to the introduction of the 1949 statute, focusing on the issue of 
sentencing of women convicted of non-capital offences after appearing at the Central 
Criminal Court (C.C.C.) on a murder charge.  Drawing on the evidence available in the State 
Books for the Central Criminal Court (S.B.C.C.C.) for the period 1924-1949, sentencing 
disposals of women convicted of infanticide-related offences, such as manslaughter and 
concealment of birth, are explored.3 As has been found by other scholars,4 one notable 
aspect of sentencing in these cases was the use of non-penal institutions, mostly run by 
Catholic religious congregations, as alternative disposals to imprisonment for women 
convicted of infanticide-related offences. In this regard, literature concerning the impact of 
the gender ideologies of the Irish Free State will be examined. The impact of these 
patriarchal philosophies on sentencing will be considered, alongside other possible 
motivations for the use of religious establishments in the punishment of maternal 
infanticide. One of the questions considered is whether the apparent gendered response to 
infanticide in Ireland was unique to Ireland and a product of the Irish Free State’s 
patriarchal, conservative, catholic, and nationalist philosophies, or whether it reflects wider 
trends in the response to female criminality which have been identified elsewhere. 
 
II - Gender Ideology of the Irish Free State 
 
In the aftermath of the Great Famine of the mid-nineteenth century, and the social 
and economic upheaval that ensued, the status of women in Irish society deteriorated.5 
During this period, the economic interests of the strong farmer had a major impact on Irish 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
circumstances normally amounting to murder, while “the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her 
not having fully recovered from the effects of giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation 
consequent upon the birth of the child”. The 1949 Act followed almost exactly the infanticide model created by 
the English Infanticide Acts of 1922 and 1938. The Irish infanticide provisions have since been amended: see 
Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006, s. 22.   
3 Other archival sources were also consulted, including government files on the infanticide reform. Where the 
term “infanticide-related offence(s)” is used in this article, it refers to convictions for the offences of 
manslaughter, concealment of birth, or child cruelty/abandonment, on a charge of murder. 
4 For example, see generally, C. Rattigan, “What Else Could I Do”: Single Mothers and Infanticide, Ireland 1900-
1950 (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2012) [hereinafter Rattigan]; L. Ryan, Gender, Identity and the Irish Press: 
Embodying the Nation (Lampeter: Edwin Mellen, 2002) [hereinafter Ryan, Gender]; A. Guilbride, I Went Away 
in Silence: A Study of Infanticide in Ireland from 1925-1957 (M.A. Thesis, 1995, WERCC, UCD) [hereinafter 
Guilbride, I Went Away]; S. Larmour, Aspects of the State and Female Sexuality in the Irish Free State, 1922-1949 
(Ph.D. Thesis, University College Cork, 1998) [hereinafter Larmour].  
5 See generally J.J. Lee, “Women and the Church since the Famine” in M. MacCurtain and D. O’Corráin, eds., 
Women in Irish Society: The Historical Dimension (Dublin: Arlen House, 1978) 37-45; R.M. Rhodes, Women and 
Family in Post Famine Ireland: Status and Opportunity in a Patriarchal Society (New York and London: Garland, 
1992) at ch. 3 [hereinafter Rhodes]. 
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social life, with one notable effect being an increasingly high regard for female chastity.6 
The predominance of middle-class farmer values contributed to Ireland’s emergence as a 
patriarchal society.7  With independence from Britain, these patriarchal values made their 
way into official discourse through the efforts of a predominately male, Catholic, and 
nationalist administration.  Like many of their European counterparts during the inter-war 
period,8 Free State officials embarked on a process of “nation-building” and sought to instil 
and reinforce in the public their ideas of essential “Irish” attributes.9 As was the case 
elsewhere,10 one factor identified as integral to the nation’s character was the purity of its 
citizens, and it seems that increasing disquiet about sexual morality, emanating from 
government, church and other circles, precipitated a process of legislating to enforce moral 
order.11 The Irish state was informed and aided in its legislative efforts by the Catholic 
Church, which, having gained a uniquely influential position in the new order,12 served to 
cultivate, bolster and perpetuate the ideologies on which the Free State leaders sought to 
develop the Irish nation.13  
 
The focus on traditional standards and the perceived link between public morals and 
the security of the Irish nation had a particular impact on women.14 Ecclesiastical and 
political discourse constructed an idealised Irish woman, one who, by being pure, passive, 
self-sacrificing, and domestic, would support the state’s efforts to develop the fledging 
                                                          
6 See generally Rhodes, ibid.; Lee, ibid. at 38-39.  
7 Rhodes, ibid. 
8 See J.H. Whyte, Church and State in Modern Ireland 1923-1979, 2nd ed., (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1980) at 
33-34 [hereinafter Whyte] See also, C. Hug, The Politics of Sexual Morality in Ireland (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1999) at 78-79 [hereinafter Hug]; M. Valiulis, “Neither Feminist nor Flapper: the Ecclesiastical Construction 
of the Ideal Irish Woman” in M. O’Dowd and S. Wichert, eds., Chattel, Servant or Citizen: Women’s Status in 
Church, State and Society (Institute of Irish Studies: Queen’s University Belfast, 1995) 168-178, at 177-178 
[hereinafter Valiulis].  
9 See generally S. McAvoy, “The Regulation of Sexuality in the Irish Free State, 1929-1935” in G. Jones and E. 
Malcolm, eds., Medicine, Disease and the State in Ireland, 1650-1940 (Cork: Cork University Press, 1998) 253-
266 [hereinafter McAvoy]; M. Luddy, Prostitution and Irish Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007) 194-200 [hereinafter Luddy]; Hug, ibid. at 77-84; A. Guilbride, “Infanticide: The Crime of Motherhood” 
in P. Kennedy, ed., Motherhood in Ireland (Cork: Mercier, 2003)  170-180, at 170-171 [hereinafter Guilbride, 
Infanticide]; Valiulis, ibid.  
10 See literature cited supra note 8.  
11 See literature cited supra note 9.  
12 See Whyte, supra note 8, esp. chs. 2-10; T. Inglis, Moral Monopoly: The Rise and Fall of the Catholic Church in 
Modern Ireland (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 1998) at 77-80; D. Ferriter, The Transformation of 
Ireland 1900-2000 (London: Profile, 2004) esp. at 337-340, 408-410, 520-523.  
13 See generally, Valiulis, supra note 8; Whyte, supra note 8, ch. 2; Luddy, supra note 9 at 194-197; Hug, supra 
note 8 at 77-78.  
14 This was also the case elsewhere. See literature cited at supra note 8.  
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nation and help defend it against the forces of modern influence.15 Particular importance 
was placed on the virtue of Irish women. It seems that a view emerged which identified 
sexual immorality in females as posing a threat, not only to the family, but also to the 
stability of the new nation.16 One group of women attracted particular attention in the 
state’s drive towards national purity: the unmarried mother. These women represented the 
antithesis of the idealised version of womanhood presented by state and church officials and 
were thought to pose a particular danger to the nation’s morality.17  Thus, although 
motherhood was idealised by politicians and church-men alike, “the female body and the 
maternal body, particularly in its unmarried condition, became a central focus of concern to 
the state and the Catholic Church”.18  
 
A. Unmarried Mothers and the Irish Free State 
 
During this period in Irish history, and indeed for decades after, giving birth outside 
of wedlock was an intensely shameful experience which presented many difficulties for 
women. Strong cultural disapproval of illegitimacy and sexual immorality meant unmarried 
mothers potentially faced familial condemnation and alienation from the community, as well 
as unemployment and economic hardship. Double standards in sexual morality allowed men 
to avoid responsibility.19 Although it was possible to seek financial assistance from the 
infant’s father through the courts, this was not without obstacles, not least of which was the 
requirement for corroborative evidence of paternity.20  Unmarried pregnant women and 
girls who were not offered family protection, or who were without other forms of support 
were expected to rely on the care offered by the local County Home21 or, preferably, a 
charitable institution, such as a Magdalen asylum or another special religious establishment 
which catered for unmarried mothers.22 Luddy has noted that the Catholic Church willingly 
adopted the role of providing for care and assistance for unmarried mothers, viewing it as 
                                                          
15 See generally Valiulis, supra note 8. See also Luddy, supra note 9 at 194-197; L. Ryan, “Irish Newspaper 
Representations of Women, Migration and Pregnancy outside Marriage in the 1930s” in M. C. Ramblado-
Minero and A. Pérez-Vides, eds., Single Motherhood in Twentieth Century Ireland: Cultural, Historical and Social 
Essays (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2006) 103-122, at 105-106 [hereinafter Ryan, Newspaper 
Representations]. 
16 Luddy, supra note 9 at 194-197; Ryan, Gender, supra note 4 at 257-259. 
17 Luddy, supra note 9 at 197 and 200-203.  
18 Ibid. at 194.   
19 Ryan, Newspaper Representations, supra note 15 at 116-117; Guilbride, Infanticide, supra note 9 at 176-177. 
20 Illegitimate Children (Affiliation Orders) Act 1930. See McAvoy, supra note 9 at 260; Guilbride, ibid. at 173.  
21 These had previously been workhouses under the Poor Law system.   
22 See generally L. Earner-Byrne, Mother and Child: Maternity and Child Welfare in Dublin, 1922-60 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007) 182-190 [hereinafter Earner-Byrne]; Luddy, supra note 9 at 
117-123, 201-203 and 235-237; Ryan, Newspaper Representations, supra note 15 at 107. 
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an opportunity not only to reform sexually deviant women and to prevent them from 
further moral corruption, but also to ensure their retention in the Catholic faith.23  
 
Although there were no legal powers by which to compel a woman to attend or 
remain at an institution for “fallen women”, the official stance seems to have been that 
unwed mothers seeking assistance should rely on voluntary institutions run by Catholic 
nuns, or, for those of other religious denominations, another suitable home or refuge.24 The 
rationale for detention of unmarried mothers was three-fold: prevention; redemption; and 
containment.25 Women seem to have been separated into categories depending on their 
number of “falls”.26 The attitude towards first “offenders”, the “hopeful cases”, was not 
necessarily unforgiving.27 They were identified as innocent victims who were susceptible to 
moral reform, and, thus, were treated less severely. They were also possibly subject to less 
lengthy stays, with one year being the recommended residence period.28 Repeat offenders, 
the “less hopeful cases”, seem to have been separated from other women and were possibly 
detained for longer periods for the purpose of containment.29    
 
In summary, as a result of cultural and ideological views, unmarried motherhood 
was largely unacceptable in the Irish Free State. From the state’s point of view, it appears 
that the solution to the issue of unmarried motherhood was to tacitly support 
institutionalisation of problematic women, for such periods as would ensure their reform 
and, in some cases, protect society against moral contagion.  
 
II - Infanticide in the Irish Free State  
 
The previous section outlines the prevailing official gender ideology of the Irish 
Free State, and the impact of this, in conjunction with wider cultural disapproval of 
                                                          
23 See Luddy, supra note 9 at 200-201. 
24 Ibid. at 117. The state offered no financial support; see E. Conway, “Motherhood Interrupted: Adoption in 
Ireland” in P. Kennedy, ed., Motherhood in Ireland (Cork: Mercier, 2003) 181-193 at 184. 
25 See generally, Luddy, supra note 9 at 117-119 and 200-203; Earner-Byrne, supra note 22 at 187 and 189-190.   
26 See generally, Luddy, supra note 9 at 117-119 and 201-203; Earner-Byrne, supra note 22 at 186-187 and 189. 
27 Luddy, supra note 9 at 118 and 201. 
28 Ibid. at 118 and 201-202.      
29 Luddy, supra note 9 at 118-119 and 201-203; Earner-Byrne, supra note 22 at 186-187 and 189. The one year 
minimum period specified is based on the recommendations of a 1927 official report: see Luddy, supra note 9 at 
201-202, referring to the report of the Commission on the Relief of the Sick and Destitute Poor, Including the Insane 
Poor, Dublin, 1928. See also R.S. Devane, “The Unmarried Mother and the Poor Law Commission” (1928) 
31(6) The Irish Ecclesiastical Record 561-588 at 578-580. 
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illegitimacy, on women who gave birth outside of marriage. This section briefly explores 
the phenomenon of infanticide during this period of Irish history, focusing in particular on 
the criminal justice response to this crime.  
 
In Ireland, as has been the case elsewhere where women faced adversity and 
stigmatisation for bearing children out of wedlock,30 infanticide also featured as a 
phenomenon predominantly associated with women who gave birth to illegitimate infants.31  
According to figures published by the Central Statistics Office (hereinafter C.S.O.), there 
were 135 infant-murders32 and 896 concealment of birth cases recorded between 1927 and 
1949.33 The S.B.C.C.C. for the period 1924 to 1949 contain the records of at least 181 cases 
where an individual was charged with the murder of a newly- or recently-born infant; in at 
least 160 of these cases the victim’s mother was charged.34 The typical offender was an 
unmarried woman who was suspected of killing her infant at or soon after birth following a 
                                                          
30 See: P.C. Hoffer & N.E.H. Hull, Murdering Mothers: Infanticide in England and New England 1558-1803 (New 
York: New York University Press, 1981) esp. ch. 4; K. Wrightson, “Infanticide in European History” (1982) 3 
Criminal Justice History 1-30; F. McLynn, Crime and Punishment in Eighteenth Century England (London: 
Routledge, 1989) 110-115; J.M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England, 1600-1800 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, c.1986)113-124; R.W. Malcolmson, “Infanticide in the Eighteenth Century” in J.S. Cockburn 
ed., Crime in England, 1500-1800 (London: Methuen, 1977) 187-209; D. Seaborne Davies, “Child Killing in 
English Law” in L. Radzinowicz and J.W.C. Turner, eds., The Modern Approach to Criminal Law (London: 
Macmillan, 1945) 301-343 [hereinafter Seaborne Davies]; L. Rose, Massacre of the Innocents: Infanticide in 
Britain 1800-1939 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986); A.R. Higginbotham, “‘Sin of the Age’: Infanticide 
and Illegitimacy in Victorian London” (1989) 32(3) Victorian Studies 319-337 [hereinafter Higginbotham]; 
C.B. Backhouse, “Desperate Women and Compassionate Courts: Infanticide in Nineteenth Century Canada” 
(1984) 34(4) University of Toronto Law Journal 447-478.  
31 For accounts of infanticide in the Irish Free State see Rattigan, supra note 4; Guilbride, Infanticide, supra note 
9; Ryan, Gender, supra note 4, ch. 6; L. Ryan, “The Press, Police and Prosecution: Perspectives on Infanticide in 
the 1920s” in A. Hayes and D. Urquhart, eds., Irish Women’s History (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2004) 137-
151.   
32 Defined as the murder infants aged one year and under; Central Statistics Office, Annual Abstracts 1927-1949. 
The murder of persons aged over one year is recorded separately.  
33 Ibid. The Central Statistics Office did not publish criminal statistics for the period up to 1927. These figures 
show a significant fall in these crimes since the mid-eighteenth century. See I. O’Donnell, “Lethal Violence in 
Ireland, 1841 to 2003: Famine, Celibacy, and Parental Pacification” (2005) 45 British Journal of Criminology 
671-695 [hereinafter O’Donnell]. 
34  See National Archives of Ireland: State Books at Central Criminal Court IC-88-59 (Oct. 1924-April 1925, 
Dublin City); IC-88-61 (June 1925 – Dec. 1926, Change of Venue Cases Dublin); IC-88-60 (June 1925 - June 
1927, Dublin), ID-33-68 (Nov. 1927 – June 1933); ID-24-129 (Feb. 1928 – Nov. 1943, City of Dublin); ID-11-
92 (Nov. 1933 – April 1941), ID-27-1 (Oct. 1941 – Dec. 1945), V15-4-15 (Feb. 1946 – Dec. 1952). National 
Archives of Ireland [hereinafter N.A.I.]; S.B.C.C.C. These records provide the following information: the 
name of the offender(s); the offence(s) charged; the result of the criminal proceedings; the sentence imposed.  
This sample includes only those cases where it is evident from the information contained in the S.B.C.C.C. that 
the victim was an infant.  The mother of the infant was accused of the murder in at least 160 of these cases. In 
ten of the remaining 21 cases, it is clear that the accused was not the mother of the infant; the relationship of 
the accused to the victim is unknown in 11 cases, though it is probable that in most, if not all, of these cases 
that the accused was the victim’s mother. There are undoubtedly other cases of infant-murder in the S.B.C.C.C. 
which have been omitted from this sample due to the limited information provided on the S.B.C.C.C. record. 
For the period 1922-1950, Rattigan, supra note 4, identified 191 cases of “infanticide”, involving mothers and 
other individuals.   
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concealed pregnancy.35 The accused usually acted alone.36 Occasionally, however, a close 
female relative, such as a sister, mother, or grandmother, provided assistance. Men were 
rarely charged in connection with the murder of an infant. In particular, the victim’s father 
was normally not involved.37  
 
 The historical record shows that although numerous women suspected of killing 
their infants appeared at the C.C.C. on murder indictments between 1924 and 1949, the vast 
majority of these cases were ultimately disposed of on the basis of a non-capital conviction.  
As stated, 160 cases of maternal infanticide were identified in the S.B.C.C.C. in this study.38 
Forty-five cases in this sample were disposed of by a jury verdict. Juries proved very 
reluctant to convict of the capital charge, finding the woman guilty of murder in only eight 
cases (17.4 % of those tried and 5% of those charged). The majority of the cases, 58.8% 
(twenty-six in total), where the accused was tried before a jury on a murder indictment, 
resulted in a full acquittal. However, in two of these cases, the accused, who had also been 
charged with concealment of birth (hereinafter C.O.B.), had pleaded guilty to that offence 
and so did not avoid conviction altogether. One woman was found “guilty but insane”. In 
the remaining ten cases, the accused was acquitted of murder, but convicted of either 
manslaughter (five cases) or C.O.B. (five cases).  The majority of women charged with 
murdering their infants, 72% (112 cases), pleaded guilty, usually at arraignment, to a lesser 
related offence, mainly manslaughter (sixty-two cases) or C.O.B. (forty-seven cases),39 and 
the prosecution did not pursue further the murder charge.40 This practice is particularly 
                                                          
35 See Rattigan, supra note 4 at ch. 1, esp. at 38-58; Ryan, Gender, supra note 4 at 269-271. The S.B.C.C.C. often 
describes the victim as an “unnamed” or “recently born” infant. 
36 Another person was also charged with the murder of the infant, either on the same or a separate indictment, 
in 18 out of the 160 cases involving mothers that were identified from the S.B.C.C.C. records.  
37 For accounts of cases involving other persons, particularly family members, see: C. Rattigan, “’Done to 
Death by Father or Relatives’: Irish Families and Infanticide Cases, 1922-1950” (2008) 13(4) The History of 
the Family 370-383; Ryan, Gender, supra note 4 at 282-286.  
38 See supra at note 34.  
39 Three women pleaded guilty to the statutory offences of abandonment or child cruelty under the Children’s 
Act 1908, section 12. 
40 In some cases C.O.B. or abandonment/cruelty had been charged as a separate offence on the same or a 
separate indictment. The offence of C.O.B. was (and continues to be) provided for by section 60 of the Offences 
against the Person Act 1861; 24 and 25 Vict. c. 100 (hereinafter O.A.P.A. 1861). This offence was classified as a 
misdemeanour and was punishable by a maximum of two years imprisonment (with hard labour). Section 60 
makes it an offence for any person to “endeavour to conceal the birth” of a child “by any secret disposition of 
the dead body of [that] child, whether such child died before, at, or after its birth… .” C.O.B. is not a homicide 
offence, though historically it has featured very commonly in infanticide cases in England and other 
jurisdictions as an alternative to a murder conviction where “live birth” could not be established, or where 
jurors were uneasy about convicting the woman of a capital offence. See R. Sauer, “Infanticide and Abortion in 
Nineteenth Century Britain” (1978) 32 Population Studies 81-93 at 82; Higginbotham, supra note 30 at 331-
332; Seaborne Davies, supra note 30 at 321; K.J. Kramar, Unwilling Mothers, Unwanted Babies: Infanticide in 
Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005) at ch. 1 [hereinafter Kramar].  
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evident during the 1940s, where over 90% of all cases where a woman appeared before the 
C.C.C. on a charge of murder did not go to trial because the accused pleaded guilty to a non-
capital offence.41 In total, 124 women were convicted of a non-capital offence after 
appearing at the C.C.C. on a murder charge and their cases were disposed of on that basis.42   
 
This outline of disposals of maternal infanticide cases at the C.C.C. provides only a 
snapshot of the criminal justice response to this crime. It does not, for example, account for 
manslaughter and C.O.B. charges prosecuted at either the C.C.C. or the lower courts of 
criminal trial during this period. As noted, almost 900 cases of C.O.B. were recorded by the 
C.S.O. between 1927 and 1949, almost all of which would not have been prosecuted at the 
C.C.C. An unknown number of these cases may have involved unlawful killings for which 
there was inadequate evidence to support a murder indictment. Furthermore, a Department 
of Justice memorandum connected with the infanticide reform of 1949 noted that for 
“motives of humanity”, the Attorney General usually reduced a murder charge to C.O.B, 
unless the evidence obliged him to proceed with the capital indictment.43 District judges at 
preliminary hearings may well have reduced a number of murder charges to C.O.B., either 
for reasons of sympathy or because there was insufficient evidence to support the capital 
charge. Thus, not every case of suspected murder was prosecuted on that charge.  
 
Overall, the evidence available shows that maternal infanticide was unambiguously 
treated with leniency. Although this crime was clearly not ignored by the authorities, very 
few women charged with murdering their infants were actually convicted of that offence, 
with most of those charged being disposed of on the basis of self-conviction for a non-
capital offence. In the following section, the criminal justice response to maternal infanticide 
is further explored by examining the way the courts sentenced women convicted of an 




                                                          
41 Fifty-seven cases of maternal infant-murder appeared at the C.C.C. during that time: in 52 cases the accused 
pleaded guilty to a lesser-related offence. The outcomes of the remaining cases, all of which went to trial, are: 
two murder convictions, one of which was successfully appealed and the woman pleaded guilty to 
manslaughter at a re-trial; one insanity verdict; two acquittals.  
42 For a detailed discussion of the prosecution of infanticide at the C.C.C. during this period, see K. Brennan, 
“‘A Fine Mixture of Pity and Justice’: The Criminal Justice Response to Infanticide in Ireland, 1922-1949” Law 
and History Review (forthcoming).  
43 N.A.I., DJ 8/144/1, memo dated Feb. 1949. 
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III - Sentencing of Women Convicted of Infanticide-Related Offences at the C.C.C, 
1924-1949 
 
Of the 160 women in this sample who appeared at the C.C.C. on an infant-murder 
charge, eight were sentenced to death, as was mandatory on a murder conviction.44 
However, a reprieve was granted in each of these cases and the sentence was commuted to 
penal servitude for life. The S.B.C.C.C. provides no further information on these cases. 
However, two “Returns of Persons Sentenced to Death”, covering the period 1922-1937, 
indicate that it was standard practice for juries to recommend mercy in infanticide cases and 
for trial judges to endorse this in their recommendation to the Executive Council (the 
government).45 It seems that women were usually released on licence after serving only a 
few years of their sentence.46 Given that the judiciary had no discretion regarding the 
sentence imposed for murder, these cases are not considered further, except to say that it 
appears to have been unambiguously accepted by the judiciary and the government that 
women who murdered their infants ought not to be subject to the death penalty, or, indeed, 
a lengthy prison stay.47  
 
One hundred and twenty-four women were sentenced at the C.C.C. for an 
infanticide-related offence.48 All of those sentenced in this sample had initially been charged 
with murder, but the case had been disposed of on the basis of a conviction for 
manslaughter, C.O.B., or, more rarely, abandonment or child cruelty. The vast majority of 
these offenders were sentenced on foot of a guilty plea to one of the aforementioned 
offences; only ten of the 124 women sentenced for an infanticide-related offence in this 
sample had been convicted by a jury of that offence following a murder trial.49 Sixty-seven 
                                                          
44 One other woman was found guilty but insane and was ordered to be detained at the pleasure of the 
Governor-General. See N.A.I., S.B.C.C.C. I.D.-27-1, A.G. v. M.F., 15 Nov. 1943. To preserve anonymity, only 
the initials of those accused of infanticide are provided in this article. 
45 N.A.I., Department of Taoiseach file (Capital Punishment) s7788(a), Return of Persons Sentenced to Death, 
1922-32/1932-37. This Return of death penalty cases includes two other cases of maternal infanticide that 
resulted in a murder conviction which are not listed on the S.B.C.C.C. These cases are not included in this 
sample.  
46 Ibid.  
47 Some women who were released early on licence may have been sent to a Magdalen Laundry or another 
similar institution: see The Report of the Interdepartmental Committee to establish the facts of State involvement with 
the Magdalen Laundries (February 2013) at ch. 9 para. 216-218, available at: http: 
http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/MagdalenRpt2013 [hereinafter Magdalen Report]. 
48 See supra text at notes 38-42.  
49 Ibid. 
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women were sentenced on a manslaughter conviction; 54 were sentenced on a conviction 
for C.O.B.; and three women were sentenced for another offence.50  
 
Slightly more than half of the women in this sample (65 of the 124 women who were 
sentenced for an infanticide-related offence; 52.4%) were given a custodial sentence, either a 
term of penal servitude, or a term of imprisonment, with or without hard labour.51 40.7% of 
women convicted of C.O.B. and 64.2% of those convicted of manslaughter were disposed of 
in this way. Custodial terms ranged from two months to four years in length, with most 
sentences, 63.1% (41 in number), being for a period of 12 months or less. In terms of the 
difference between manslaughter and C.O.B. convictions, the vast majority of those 
convicted of the latter (90.9%) received a term of imprisonment of 12 months or less, while 
a little less than half of those convicted of manslaughter were given a custodial term of 12 
months or less (48.8%). Indeed, a slight majority (51.2%) of those sentenced on the homicide 
offence were given a period of at least 18 months custody. No-one convicted of C.O.B. was 
given a term in excess of eighteen months imprisonment.52 In about one fifth (20.9%) of 
cases where a custodial sentence was given on a manslaughter conviction, the term imposed 
was in excess of two years.53 Presumably, the fact that custody was imposed more 
frequently and for longer terms in cases of manslaughter reflects the increased seriousness 
of this offence. 
 
However, only 20 women (16.1% of the 124 women who were sentenced on an 
infanticide-related conviction) actually served a term of imprisonment. In the majority of 
cases (69.2%) where custody was imposed, the sentence was suspended on the accused 
entering a recognisance to abide by certain conditions. It appears that none of the 
suspended sentences were subsequently activated as a result of the offender defaulting on 
her recognisance. There was little difference between the numbers of women convicted of 
either C.O.B. or manslaughter who actually served a prison sentence: only 14.8% of those 
convicted of C.O.B. and 17.9% of those convicted of manslaughter were sent to prison. 
Thus, the disparity noted between the number of C.O.B. and number of manslaughter 
                                                          
50 See generally, ibid. 
51 Women convicted of C.O.B. were punishable by a maximum sentence of two years imprisonment with or 
without hard labour; O.A.P.A. 1861, section 60. Manslaughter was punishably by a maximum sentence of penal 
servitude for life; O.A.P.A. 1861, section 5.  
52 Indeed only two of those convicted of C.O.B. were given a term of greater than 12 months; both of these 
women were sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. The sentence was not suspended in either case.  
53 In each of these cases the sentence was penal servitude, the minimum term being three years. No woman 
was given a term in excess of 4 years penal servitude.  
2013 Punishing Infanticide in the Irish Free State 11 
 
 
convictions that attracted a custodial sentence is accounted for by the fact that suspended 
sentences were more commonly imposed in cases of manslaughter.54  
 
It is apparent that in addition to the trend of suspending custodial sentences in 
infanticide cases, a high percentage of women who appeared at the C.C.C. for sentence on an 
infanticide-related conviction were not given a custodial sentence. Indeed, despite the fact 
that the offences these women were convicted of were all punishable by 
imprisonment/penal servitude, 47.6% of cases (59 in total) where a woman was sentenced 
for an infanticide-related offence did not attract a custodial penalty. In five of these cases, 
the offender was discharged without conditions; in one other case the woman was 
discharged on the basis of an undertaking entered by a third party.55 In the remaining 53 
cases, the accused was released56 on entering a recognisance to abide by particular 
conditions. It appears that recognisances were entered either as part of a conditional 
discharge (or probation) under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act 1907 (P.O.A. 
1907),57 or possibly in some cases as a result of the court’s traditional authority to require 
offenders to enter recognisances or, in other words, to “bind-over” offenders with certain 
conditions attached.58  
 
The P.O.A. 1907 provides that on a conviction on indictment for an offence 
punishable by imprisonment the court may, in lieu of imprisonment, order that the offender 
be conditionally discharged on their entering into a recognisance to be of good behaviour 
and to appear for sentence if called to do so at any time during a specified period.59 Aside 
from probationary supervision,60 other more onerous conditions, including requirements as 
                                                          
54 46.3% (31 in number) of women convicted of manslaughter were given a suspended custodial sentence; only 
25.9 per cent of COB convictions attracted this penalty.  
55 N.A.I., S.B.C.C.C. I.C.-88-61, A.G. v. M.J.McD., 8 Feb. 1927: “discharged on undertaking of Mrs M[…] to 
hand prisoner over to Mr C[…] of […]”. It is not clear who these parties were, and, in particular, whether 
this involved some kind of institutional disposal.  
56 The terminology used in the records was that the offender was “allowed out”, was released, or was 
discharged.    
57 7 Edw. VII, c. 17. 
58 For information on the recognisance/the bind-over see: N. Walker, An Analysis of the Penal System in Theory, 
Law and Practice: Crime and Punishment in Britain, 2nd ed., (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968) 169-
170 [hereinafter Walker]; T. O’Malley, Sentencing Law and Practice, 2nd ed., (Dublin: Thomson Round Hall, 
2006) ch. 25 [hereinafter O’Malley]; N. Morgan, “Binding Over: the Law Commission Working Paper” 
[1998] Criminal Law Review 355-368 [hereinafter Morgan].   
59 P.O.A. 1907, section 1(2). The maximum period that could be set was three years. 
60 P.O.A. 1907, section 2(1). The Act essentially allowed for two disposals on a conviction on indictment, either 
a recognisance/a conditional discharge, or a probation order (a conditional discharge with supervision); see G. 
Mair & L. Burke, Redemption, Rehabilitation and Risk Management: A History of Probation (Abingdon: Routledge, 
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to residence, and any other conditions “as the court may, having regard to the particular 
circumstances of the case, consider necessary for preventing a repetition of the same offence 
or the commission of other offences”, could also be attached.61 The S.B.C.C.C. records do 
not clearly specify whether in cases involving recognisances judges were imposing a 
conditional discharge/probation under the P.O.A. 1907 or a bind-over. It is assumed that 
where the two requirements of a conditional discharge, namely to be of good behaviour and 
to come up for sentence if called, were imposed, that the judge was exercising his discretion 
under the 1907 statute.62   
 
Where an infanticide offender entered a recognisance, either as a result of a 
suspended sentence, a conditional discharge/probation,63 or possibly a bind-over, she was 
usually conditioned to keep the peace and/or be of good behaviour for a certain period, and, 
in most cases, was also bound to appear for sentence if called upon to do so. Aside from 
these standard requirements, the most common condition attached to a recognisance 
undertaken at the C.C.C. by a woman who had been convicted of an infanticide-related 
offence was that the she would enter and remain at a designated institution, usually a 
religious-run establishment, for a specified period, and that she would obey the rules and 
regulations there.64 Forty of the 45 women who were given a suspended sentence and 33 of 
the 53 women who were conditionally discharged/bound over undertook to abide by a 
condition of institutional residence.  
 
Overall, 73 women (58.9%) in this sample entered a recognisance which 
incorporated a condition of institutional residence. The vast majority were sent to convents 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2012) at 26 [hereinafter Mair & Burke]. Probation is essentially a conditional discharge with a condition of 
supervision attached; see O’Malley, supra note 58 at 472-473.  
61 See P.O.A. 1907, s. 2(2), as amended by the Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914, section 8 [4 & 5 Geo. V, 
c. 58].  
62  Possibly the Irish records inaccurately recorded the conditions attached to the recognisance in some cases – 
i.e. there may be cases where the offender was conditionally discharged under the P.O.A. 1907, but the record 
does not accurately reflect this. However, in cases where the recognisance did not include the requisite 
conditions for a conditional discharge, it is possible that the court was using the bind-over option. There 
appears to be a lack of clarity, however, in the authorities on whether the bind-over could be used as a sentence 
in its own right, or whether, particularly in cases involving felonies, it was an ancillary order. Walker, supra 
note 58 at 169-170, notes that courts could order persons to enter recognisances to keep the peace and be of 
good behaviour either in combination with another sentence (for certain offences), or instead of passing 
sentence. However, see also Morgan, supra note 58 at 360-361; O’Malley, supra note 58 at 486.  
63 Although in some cases it is evident that probationary supervision was attached, it is not always clear from 
the records whether the offender was placed under the supervision of a probation officer. Due to the lack of 
clarity in the records, no distinction will be made in this article between discharges involving probationary 
supervision and those which did not (see supra at note 60); disposals under the P.O.A. 1907 will be referred to 
generally as conditional discharges.  
64 In one case, it appears that the judge ordered the woman to reside at the home in question, without her 
having agreed to this as part of an undertaking to the court.  
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run by Catholic nuns, such as the various Magdalen asylums in Dublin and other parts of 
the country, and Our Lady’s Home at Henrietta Street in Dublin; protestant offenders were 
sent to Bethany Home in Dublin, and one woman was sent to a Legion of Mary Hostel.65 In 
93.2 % of cases involving institutional detention, the period specified was between one and 
two years. The terms imposed were: three months (1 case); 12 months (35 cases); 15 months 
(2 cases); 18 months (14 cases); two years (17 cases) and three years (3 cases).66 In one case, 
the offender was sent to a convent “until her marriage … was solemnised”.67  
 
In terms of the length of residence required as part of these recognisances, it appears 
that women sent to convents and other similar establishments were often sentenced to a 
longer periods of institutional “detention” than those given an ordinary custodial penalty.68 
This is particularly evident in cases involving C.O.B. convictions. For example, over 90% of 
those given a prison term on foot of a C.O.B. conviction were given a sentence of 12 months 
or less. No-one convicted of that offence was given the maximum term of two years 
imprisonment and only two women (9.1%) were given a term exceeding one year.69 
However, just over 35% of institutional disposals in cases involving C.O.B. convictions 
involved a term of residence in excess of 12 months. Indeed, just over one quarter of 
convent disposals on a C.O.B. conviction involved at least a two-year residential period.70 
Although the disparity is not as evident in manslaughter cases, there does seem to have 
been a tendency to impose slightly longer terms of institutional residence.71  
 
An examination of those cases where a custodial sentence was suspended in favour 
of institutional residence also indicates that judges tended to send women to convents for 
longer periods than they did in the case of prison. In 42.5% of such cases the period of 
institutional residence was longer than the custodial term imposed. More strikingly, in a 
significant majority (76.9%) of COB cases where a term of imprisonment had been 
                                                          
65 For convenience, references to convents in this article encompass establishments run by Catholic nuns, and 
Bethany Home. Legion of Mary Hostels were often used as places of residence for offenders on probation; see 
E. Fahy, “Probation of Offenders” (1943) 62 Hermathena 61 at 80 [hereinafter Fahy]. 
66 In the vast majority of cases the period of residence set was definite. Very occasionally, however, the record 
notes that the offender was to reside at the institution in question for at least the period stated.  
67 See N.A.I., S.B.C.C.C. I.D.-11-92, A.G. v. T.C., 19 Nov. 1934. 
68 See Rattigan, supra note 4 at 210-211, who makes the same finding.  
69 In both cases an 18-month term was imposed. See supra note 52. 
70 22.58% (seven) were given a 2 year term; 9.68% (three) were given an 18-month term; one woman was given 
a three-year term, with an option for release after two years on the approval of the institution’s medical officer.  
71 62.5% of women convicted of manslaughter (25) who were given a convent disposal were detained for a 
period in excess of 12 months, while only slightly more than half of those (51.2%) given prison terms were 
sentenced to a term of greater than 12 months. However, most of the prison terms were suspended. 
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suspended in favour of an institutional disposal, the offender was subjected to a lengthier 
term of detention than if she had been sent to prison; the same is true in a little over a 
quarter of manslaughter cases.72 
 
In choosing the period of residence required, though judges were likely influenced 
by standard sentencing considerations, such as, for example, offence seriousness, and other 
aggravating or mitigating factors, they were also possibly constrained by the policies of the 
institutions involved. The establishments relied on were voluntary organisations and 
therefore were not subject to state control or interference. Thus, admission to a convent or 
similar institution was at the discretion of the authorities there and they were not legally 
obliged to admit criminal offenders.73 It seems plausible that the institutional authorities 
were able to suggest, if not prescribe, as a condition of admitting an offender, the period of 
residence to which she be subject. Institutional disposals at the C.C.C. were usually for 
periods of between one and two years duration.74 If the minimum period of residence for 
unmarried mothers seeking assistance at these institutions was not less than twelve 
months,75 it is possible that female offenders would not have been accepted unless they 
agreed to stay for a period congruent with institutional policy in relation to other residents.  
 
As noted, the provisions of the P.O.A. 1907 granted judges the authority to impose a 
wide range of conditions to a conditional discharge, including, specifically, a requirement as 
to residence.76 Under this statute judges had the discretion to impose such conditions for a 
maximum of three years.77 In the case of suspended sentences and bind-overs, it seems that 
courts derived authority to impose institutional residence as a result of its own assumed 
power to attach a wide range of conditions to these non-statutory disposals. Luddy notes, 
however, that in the early 1940s Department of Justice officials expressed unease about the 
practice of suspending sentences on condition that the offender undertook to enter a 
religious institution, noting that this “makeshift practice” left the authorities powerless to 
force offenders to remain if they decided to leave at any time.78 However, although there 
                                                          
72 In 44.4% of manslaughter cases where a woman was given a suspended sentence with an institutional 
disposal, the required period of residence was equal to the proposed period of imprisonment.  
73 J.M. Smith, Ireland’s Magdalen Laundries and the Nation’s Architecture of Containment (Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 2007) at 65 [hereinafter Smith]. 
74 See supra text at notes 66-67. Overall, three women were given a residence period in excess of two years; 
only two women were given a term of less than one year.  
75 See supra text at notes 28-29. 
76 See supra text at note 61.  
77 P.O.A. 1907, s.1(2). See supra text at note 59. 
78 Luddy, supra note 9 at 121, referring to N.A.I., Department of Justice 8/128 Criminal Justice (Female 
Offenders Bill) 1942, File Jus 8/128. 
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may have been no statutory power by which to compel a female offender to remain at a 
convent, courts did retain the authority to impose a prison sentence in the event of the 
offender being in breach the terms of the recognisance. In most cases where a period of 
institutional residence was agreed to as part of a recognisance, it constituted an alternative 
to a custodial sentence, which had either been suspended or which the court retained the 
option to pass for a specified period.79 The threat of a custodial penalty probably constituted 
sufficient incentive for compliance with the residential requirement attached to the 
recognisance. The S.B.C.C.C. notes only one case where a woman defaulted on her 
recognisance, which was entered as part of a conditional discharge, by breaking the rules 
and regulations of the convent to which she had been sent. She was brought before the 
court twice and was eventually ordered to serve a term of imprisonment.80 
 
Not every woman who was conditionally discharged, bound-over, or given a 
suspended sentence was required to undertake a period of institutional residence. Five of 
those given suspended sentences and 20 of the 53 women who entered a recognisance as 
part of a conditional discharge or bind-over were released into the community.  One woman 
in the latter group was handed over to her parents on release. Interestingly, one woman 
who was conditionally discharged/bound-over also undertook to “immediately” marry a 
particular individual, presumably the father of the infant-victim. Two months later, a 
certificate of marriage was lodged with the court and it was noted on the record that “there 
will be no necessity for further appearance or application on her behalf to the court”.81 
Finally, in three cases, the offender entered a recognisance to appear at the next sitting of 
the court for sentence if called upon to do so. All of these women were married in the 
interim period.82 Arguably, marriage was an implicit condition of their release and of the 
court’s decision not to sentence. 
 
This account of sentencing of women convicted of infanticide-related offences at the 
C.C.C. during the period 1924-1949 indicates that Irish judges tended to avoid imposing a 
custodial sanction on these offenders. Although just over half of those sentenced were given 
                                                          
79 Forty cases involved a suspended sentence; 33 cases involved recognisances, 23 of which included an 
undertaking to come up for sentence if called. It is unclear whether in the remaining cases (10 in total) the 
court retained the power to sentence the offender should she default on the terms of her recognisance. If these 
cases involved a bind-over, it would appear that no such power existed; see Morgan, supra note 58 at 361-362. 
80 N.A.I., S.B.C.C.C. ID-33-68, A.G. v. N.H., 9 June 1931. 
81 N.A.I., S.B.C.C.C. ID-33-68, A.G. v. M.H., 9 June 1931. 
82 N.A.I., S.B.C.C.C. ID-27-1, A.G. v. K.McG., 9 June 1942; A.G. v. S.M., 15 Nov. 1943; A.G. v. N.O’S., 13 Nov. 
1945. 
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a term of imprisonment, only 16% of the women in this sample actually served time in 
prison.83 Courts commonly used non-custodial sentencing options, including conditional 
discharges under the P.O.A. 1907, and possibly bind-overs, even in cases involving 
manslaughter convictions. What is most striking about sentencing practice in these cases is 
that almost 60% of these offenders were required to reside at a religious institution for a 
specified period. The use of convents and other similar institutions as a sentencing option in 
cases of infanticide will be further explored in the following section.  
 
IV - Punishment or Mercy: Religious Institutionalisation as a Sentencing Disposal 
 
From the above analysis it is apparent that Irish judges took a lenient approach to 
sentencing women for infanticide-related offences. The crimes for which these women were 
being sentenced were mainly manslaughter, which was punishable by a maximum of life 
imprisonment, and C.O.B., which was punishable by a maximum sentence of two years 
imprisonment with hard labour.84 Custodial sentences were imposed in only slightly more 
than half of the cases in this sample, and most of these were suspended. While suspended 
sentences did constitute a formal punishment, the offender was able to avoid the punitive 
consequences of this sanction by observing certain conditions. Further, even where a 
sentence had been imposed, suspended or otherwise, it was rare for the offender to be given 
a custodial period of more than two years. Indeed, looking only at those cases where a term 
was actually served, only three women, all of whom had been convicted of manslaughter, 
spent more than two years in prison.  
 
A similar disinclination to send women to prison for infanticide is also evident in 
England during the same period. Nigel Walker, in his examination of sentencing practice in 
England between 1922 and 1965 found a steady reduction in the use of imprisonment for 
the offence of infanticide, which had been made a separate category of homicide by virtue of 
the Infanticide Act 1922.85 For example, between 1923 and 1927, 59 women were sentenced 
for infanticide. 49.1% were given a prison sentence, two of them for three or four years 
                                                          
83 This figure excludes those who were imprisoned following a murder conviction. 
84 See supra note 51. 
85 N. Walker, Crime and Insanity in England, vol 1: The Historical Perspective (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1968) 133. The Infanticide Act 1922 (12 & 13 Geo. V, c. 18) created the offence of infanticide. It was 
available where a woman wilfully killed her newly-born child while the balance of her mind was disturbed 
from the effects of childbirth. This was amended in 1938 to extend the provisions to cover victims up to the 
age of twelve months and mental disturbances caused by the effects of lactation consequent on childbirth; 
Infanticide Act 1938 (1 & 2 Geo VI, c. 36). Infanticide was punishable by a maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment.  
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penal servitude; 42.4% were given recognisances; 5.1% were given probation; and 3.4% were 
otherwise dealt with. Between 1946 and 1950, almost half of those convicted of infanticide 
(49%) were given probation, while only 22.3% were imprisoned; 24.4% were given 
recognisances and 4.3% were otherwise dealt with.86 Walker concludes that “… the virtual 
abandonment of prison sentences as a means of dealing with a crime involving the taking of 
human life is one of the most striking developments in the history of our sentencing 
policy”.87  
 
Interestingly, Kramar’s overview of sentencing statistics for C.O.B. in Canada 
demonstrates a slight increase in the use of imprisonment for those convicted of C.O.B. 
during this period. For example, for the period 1920-1929, 46.2% of those convicted of 
C.O.B. were given a sentencing disposal classified as “other” (most likely probation); 43.7% 
were incarcerated in jails (mostly for a period of one year or less); 10.3% were sent to 
reformatories.   In the following decade, 43% of C.O.B. convictions resulted in an “other” 
disposal; 40.2% were given jail terms (again mainly for periods of less than one year); while 
17.2% were sent to reformatories. For the period 1940-1948, only 34% of convictions 
resulted in an “other” disposal; 14% were sent to reformatories; the remainder (48.8%) were 
incarcerated in jails.88 Overall, however, the data indicates a tendency towards lenient 
sentences with the majority of women being given a probationary sentence or a period of 
detention at a reformatory; where jail sentences were imposed, these were generally for 
short periods and the offender was often released after a serving a few months.89   
 
Thus, it seems that Irish judges were not alone in their non-custodial approach to 
infanticide. However, the common practice of attaching a condition of institutional 
residence to suspended sentences, conditional discharges and other recognisances meant 
that in order to avoid a prison term many women had to abide by a particularly onerous 
condition which, among other things, involved a deprivation of liberty. Indeed, when 
convent disposals are taken into consideration, it can be said that 75% of infanticide-related 
convictions resulted in a form of detention, either as a result of a custodial sanction, or, in 
the majority of cases, an undertaking for a period of institutional residence.  
                                                          
86 Ibid. Walker does not state that any of the prison sentences imposed on English women convicted of 
infanticide were suspended. 
87 Ibid.  
88 See generally, Kramar, supra note 40 at 45-50 and Tables1.4, 1.5 and 1.6. 
89 Ibid. at 50.  
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Some women may have found it difficult to leave religious institutions after the 
required period of residence had expired. This may have been due to institutional or familial 
pressure to remain, or because they lacked the necessary support to re-establish themselves 
in society, especially as a result of the difficulties involved in overcoming the stigma 
attached to their previous residence.90 However, while at least some religious congregations 
may have preferred life-long detention of penitents, there is no conclusive evidence that 
women were compelled to stay by the religious orders involved.91 Indeed, the recent 
Magdalen Report indicates that women who entered the Magdalen institutions via the 
criminal justice system usually left once they had satisfied their obligation to the court.92 It 
seems that in the case of probation admissions in particular, offenders were kept informed 
by their probation officer of the date on which they were free to leave the institution.93 
Although a small number of women did remain after the probation period had ended, the 
majority left “at or around” the time their residential obligation expired.94 Although some of 
the records are missing or incomplete, it seems that women who went to Magdalen 
Laundries on the basis of a suspended sentence may have been similarly free to leave at the 
end of the agreed period, though the Magdalen Report does not reach a clear conclusion 
with respect to this group of admissions.95 Possibly because these women were not under 
the supervision of a probation officer, they may not have been as well informed about their 
right to depart at a certain date or supported in this regard.96  
 
The impact of institutional residence on the offender was undoubtedly severe. In 
addition to being deprived of their liberty, residents were subject to harsh regimes 
involving unpaid work, religious/moral instruction, constant supervision and strict 
discipline.97 Where there was a focus on religious redemption and reform, particularly if the 
objective was to meet ideological requirements with respect to appropriate femininity, most 
                                                          
90 See Smith, supra note 73 at 66. See generally Luddy, supra note 9 at 121-123. 
91 Luddy, supra note 9 at 95 and 119-123; Smith, supra note 73 at 45; Earner-Byrne, supra note 22 at 187-189. 
92 Magdalen Report, supra note 47 at ch. 9.  
93 Ibid. at para. 152 and 158. 
94 Ibid. at page 205, and see also at paras. 179-193 for sample probation cases with dates of departure from the 
institution.  
95 See generally, ibid. at para. 195-197. 
96 For example, the Magdalen Report noted that probation officers tried to obtain employment for women who 
left these institutions after a period of probation; ibid. at para.158. It does not state whether similar supports 
were in place for those who entered via other routes.  
97 See generally, Luddy, supra note 9 at 76-123.  
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especially sexual purity, this would have added to the intensity of the experience.98  In sum, 
the impact of a residential requirement was punitive.  
 
However, it is not clear whether judges viewed institutional disposals in this way. 
Unfortunately the court records consulted in this research do not shed any light on judicial 
motives or reasoning behind sentencing practice, and, in particular, whether judges were 
cognisant of the burdens entailed in institutional residence. Judges may not have viewed 
this disposal as being as onerous as a prison term. Indeed, the fact that institutional 
residence tended to be for longer periods than custodial terms suggests that judges viewed 
residential requirements as less demanding and punitive than imprisonment.  Alexis 
Guilbride notes that although the Magdalen institutions were known as “fearsome places”, 
little was known about the actual conditions inside, and she concludes that judges probably 
believed they were being lenient when they sent women there.99 In the S.B.C.C.C. records, 
Miss Hetty Walker of Bethany Home in Dublin deposed that if the judge took “a lenient 
course”, the offender would be admitted into said Home.100 This does suggest that sending 
women to institutions was considered a relatively lenient option.101 
 
Smith, however, argues that the courts “understood [the Magdalen] institutions as 
primarily recarceral and inherently punitive”.102 Of course, even with “voluntary” detention, 
the loss of liberty involved would at the very least have implied some element of 
punishment.103 Despite the secrecy surrounding these institutions, it is possible that judges 
were aware that residents were subject to intense supervision and discipline, that they 
engaged in very demanding work for no payment in the commercial laundries attached, and 
that some “penitents” may have remained after the required residential period had ended.104 
Presumably, judges were aware of the stigmatising effect of this form of institutionalisation, 
particularly in the case of the Magdalen asylums.      
 
                                                          
98 See generally, Luddy, supra note 9, ch. 3; Smith, supra note 73, ch. 1. For further discussion see below text at 
notes 140-142 and 169-173. 
99 Guilbride, I Went Away, supra note 4 at 40-46. 
100 N.A.I., S.B.C.C.C. ID-33-68, A.G. v. E.D., 18 Nov. 1930. 
101 Rattigan, supra note 4 at 212-213, reaches a similar conclusion. 
102  Smith, supra note 73 at 65. 
103 Earner Byrne, supra note 22 at 189, notes that detention of unmarried mothers had a punitive element.  
104 Rattigan, supra note 4 at 224, observes that “… the religious orders would have had a vested interest in 
detaining these [criminal] women in their institutions, as they provided them with a cheap form of labour”. 
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However, in opting to suspend a sentence or conditionally discharge/bind-over the 
offender, it would appear that judges were declining a punitive sanction in favour of a more 
lenient, and indeed rehabilitative, outcome.105 In particular, the P.O.A. 1907, states that a 
conditional discharge may be imposed where “it is inexpedient to inflict any punishment or any 
other than a nominal punishment, or that it is expedient to release the offender on 
probation…”.106 The main objective of the disposal under this statute was to rehabilitate the 
offender.107 Suspended sentences were also possibly imposed for the purpose of facilitating 
rehabilitation or reform.108 The rehabilitative purpose of probation with a condition of 
institutional residence was noted by the Department of Justice in the late 1950s.109  
 
In England, at least, probation/conditional discharges were viewed as being 
different to punishment because they rested on the consent of the offender, rather than on 
compulsion, to enter the recognisance and abide by the conditions attached.110 Whether, in 
the unfamiliar and intimidating courtroom, the Irish infanticide offender, and other 
offenders sentenced in this manner, had a genuine choice in agreeing to undergo a period of 
institutional residence is perhaps debatable. However, Devane noted in 1924 that an 
experienced member of the judiciary had told him that many woman offenders “have in 
many instances … expressed to me in Court a desire to go, in some cases they have begged to 
be sent, to prison rather than a Home”.111 It seems that by the late 1940s the Department of 
Justice became aware of the fact that female offenders were increasingly unwilling to take 
probation with a condition of institutional residence.112 This indicates, not only that some 
women did exercise their discretion to refuse to accept a term of probation with 
institutional residence, but that convents were perceived by many to be a less attractive 
alternative to imprisonment.   
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Had sentencers not opted for periods of institutional detention, many infanticide 
offenders may have been given custodial terms. Almost 70% of prison sentences imposed in 
infanticide-related cases were suspended, with 88.9% of these being suspended on the 
woman entering a recognisance to stay at a convent or other similar establishment for a 
specified period. Notwithstanding this, it is probably true that some women were sent to 
convents where they would not otherwise have been incarcerated. This seems particularly 
likely in cases involving convictions for C.O.B., which was a misdemeanor carrying a 
maximum sentence of 2 years imprisonment. It seems that the nature and seriousness of the 
offence do not appear to have had an impact on judicial determinations about 
appropriateness of detention at a religious institution: 57.41% of those convicted of C.O.B. 
and 59.7% of those convicted of manslaughter were given an institutional disposal.  
 
V - Gender and Ideology in Infanticide Sentencing 
 
It is evident from the above that women convicted of infanticide-related offences 
were commonly given sentencing disposals which entailed a requirement for residence at a 
religious institution. While judges may not have intended to inflict a severe punishment on 
the offender, in reality, an institutional disposal would not have been a particularly lenient 
sentence. This section explores the possible connection between this sentencing custom and 
the gender ideology of the Irish Free State. It examines, in particular, the possible influence 
of patriarchal ideology on judicial decisions to impose institutional requirements on these 
offenders. In this regard, the question of whether judges sought to “punish” women for their 
breach of the paradigm standard of female behaviour is considered. The possible influence of 
notions of reform, in particular moral salvation, is also addressed.   
 
It could be said that the practice of sending women to convents post-conviction 
reflects the church and state response to unmarried motherhood, namely religious 
institutionalisation for the purposes of redemption, prevention, and, in some cases at least, 
containment.113  Larmour argues that “it is likely that the decision to confine women found 
guilty of causing the deaths of their newly born infants in convents was motivated by 
contemporary thinking on the possibility of the penance, reform and redemption of women 
whose sexual behaviour was considered unacceptable….”.114 Indeed, Rattigan’s study of 
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sentencing in infanticide cases in Ireland from 1900 to 1950 shows that the use of convents 
as a disposal was virtually unheard of prior to independence.115 Between 1900 and 1921, 
only one woman (1.9% of those sentenced) was sent to a convent;116 51.6% of women in her 
post-independence sample were sent to a convent or Bethany Home.117 Rattigan concludes: 
“[i]n post-independence Ireland, court decisions in terms of sentencing appear to have been 
affected by the gender, age and marital status of defendants. Single women who had given 
birth and were suspected of killing their illegitimate newborns seem to have been regarded 
as sexually transgressive and were, therefore, punished in a particular way”.118 Noting the 
fact that some women were released on recognisances on agreeing to marry, she adds that 
“there was perhaps more concern with containing women’s sexuality within marriage than 
with the deaths of illegitimate infants”.119 
 
It does seem, particularly in light of the change in sentencing practice post-
independence, that the gender ideologies of the new nation had an impact on the sentencing 
of women convicted of offences connected with the death of their illegitimate infants. In this 
regard, Ryan argues that women convicted of C.O.B. were “treated primarily as sinners”, 
and were punished “as much for sexual ‘immorality’ as for concealing the births of their 
infants”.120 Indeed, she contends that these offenders “were not treated like ordinary 
criminals but as a special case of deviant and disorderly behaviour”, and, as a result, were 
subjected by the legal authorities to social control mechanisms to which other offenders 
were not exposed.121  
 
This raises the possibility that infanticide offenders were “doubly punished” because 
they had broken social, as well as legal, norms.122 Double deviance theory asserts that 
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socially deviant female offenders, i.e. those who breach conventions in relation to sexuality, 
motherhood, marriage etc., may be treated more punitively by the courts and, in particular, 
may be more likely to be imprisoned than those who do not offend against ideal female 
stereotypes.123 In this regard, however, it seems that the Irish response to infanticide during 
the 1920s-1940s does not exactly reflect findings in more contemporary studies in relation 
to “excessive” punishment of “doubly deviant” women.124 Somewhat ironically, 
imprisonment was not considered a suitable sentence for most infanticide offenders. 
Further, although they were subjected to an alternative disposal, one which arguably was at 
least as severe as ordinary imprisonment, it does not necessarily follow that these offenders 
were being excessively punished because they were thought to have violated conventions of 
femininity, in addition to breaking the law.  
 
The women in this Irish infanticide sentencing sample had originally been charged 
with one of the most serious offences in the criminal law, the murder of a human being. Yet, 
their experience in the criminal justice system appears to have been one of overwhelming 
lenience. Very few women were convicted of murder. Most avoided trial altogether, as the 
State accepted a plea of guilty to a less serious offence.125 In terms of sentencing, most were 
given suspended sentences or conditional discharges, even in cases involving manslaughter 
convictions. On the face of it, a suspended sentence or a conditional discharge/bind-over 
with a condition of residence, which rarely exceeded two years and which was imposed with 
the consent of the offender, was probably not an unduly harsh disposal given the nature of 
the offences involved.  
 
As noted, however, the impact of an institutional disposal may not have been 
particularly lenient. Indeed, it is possible that in some cases an institutional disposal had a 
more severe impact on the offender than a custodial penalty, particularly where a longer 
term of detention was imposed.126 However, even if women were imprisoned for shorter 
periods, some of these offenders may have been sent to Magdalen asylums on release from 
prison.127  Further, as Quinlan’s research reveals, women imprisoned in Ireland during the 
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twentieth century were kept in the worst and most restricted conditions in the prison 
system, undertaking work which usually focused on domestic duties, such as laundry and 
needle-work.128 Although an institutional disposal had a gendered, moral and religious 
aspect to it, women’s experience of imprisonment in twentieth-century Ireland was also 
patriarchal, and women’s imprisonment was of a “moral, religious and protective” nature.129   
 
Assuming trial judges were persuaded to address the offender’s breach of moral and 
feminine conventions, it does not necessarily follow that they sought to “punish” her 
apparent social deviance in addition to her breach of the criminal law. As noted, probation 
and suspended sentences were probably meant to be more benign disposals, with a focus on 
rehabilitation rather than punishment.130 This may suggest that judges sent women to 
convents and similar institutions for the purposes of reform, most particularly moral 
reform. Interestingly, in this regard, Rattigan, in her study of infanticide cases in Ireland 
between 1921 and 1950, found that women who had more than one illegitimate pregnancy 
were less likely to be sent to a convent by the court at the time of sentencing.131 This 
suggests that the potential for reform and the supposed amenability of the offender to this 
may have been factors in sentencing decisions.132 On the other hand, however, the decision 
to not send a woman who had more than one illegitimate birth to a convent may have 
related to  the willingness of certain institutions to accept such admissions, rather than 
judicial perceptions about the potential responsiveness of the offender to moral reform.133 
 
Indeed, there may be other reasons why judges sent infanticide offenders to 
convents and other similar institutions; the use of religiously informed establishments in 
sentencing does not necessarily mean that judges were interested in the moral reform of the 
offender. Other considerations which likely played a part, such as the danger of 
imprisonment in terms of the risk of recidivism and the dearth of alternative penal options 
for young female offenders, are discussed below.134 In connection with the issue of reform, 
judges may have simply sought to facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender, in a broader 
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non-moral sense. In the absence of other more suitable alternatives within the state’s own 
penal architecture, they may have relied on the only institutional provision available that 
appeared to offer the possibility of rehabilitation.135 This is not to say that considerations 
about moral reform were wholly irrelevant. Particularly in the case of infanticide, where 
there was an ostensible connection between the offender’s criminal conduct and her 
supposed social deviance, it may have been thought that rehabilitation should also embrace 
moral reform.136  
 
Irrespective of whether judges were persuaded by notions of spiritual reform, within 
the religious institutions it seems that the opportunity for rehabilitation focused largely, if 
not exclusively, on the religious salvation of the offender. In a 1941 memorandum on 
women and girls appearing before the C.C.C. on serious charges, a female probation officer 
wrote: “… there is not provided at any … [religious] institution a well-planned, adequate, 
or specialised system of reform in keeping with modern requirements”.137 Referring to both 
Our Lady’s Home at Henrietta Street in Dublin and the various Magdalen Homes, the 
author bemoaned the lack of educational and training facilities at these institutions, and, in 
the latter case, the lack of aftercare available.138 She offered particular criticism of the 
approach to reform taken at the Magdalen institutions, stating:  
 
[t]he supervision is strict and the religious atmosphere and moral training provide a 
barrier against contamination not available in prison treatment. This religious 
training, however, is directed with the purpose of leading the subjects to a 
permanent renunciation of the world and to a life of penance in the particular 
institution, in accordance with its rules. All very laudable, but hardly appropriate for 
the type of girls undergoing a court sentence for a serious crime, seeing that with 
very rare exceptions none such would dream of remaining on in a Home voluntarily 
after the period of detention has expired.139  
 
Given the origins and purpose of these establishments it is not surprising that the focus in 
at least some religious institutions was on the spiritual reclamation of the offender, rather 
than her rehabilitation through general education or training. However, as pointed out in 
the above memorandum, it could hardly be said that these institutions were performing any 
useful rehabilitative function.  
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In this regard, it has been noted that apparently “humane” sentencing which has an 
intended rehabilitative objective may actually have an unintended punitive impact. Edwards 
has argued that, though rehabilitative options may appear lenient on the surface, they can in 
fact be “doubly oppressive” because their objective is to re-socialise the offender to conform 
to “traditional female roles”.140 Whether or not Irish judges were guided in this regard, 
within the religious institutions used for sentencing Irish women there seems to have been 
a degree of emphasis on religious and moral training, and, as such, re-socialising the 
offender to meet the standards of appropriate female behaviour, namely sexual purity.  This 
may have added to the repressive environment in which the woman was detained, thus 
increasing the level of punishment she experienced.141 As Kramar argues, referring to the 
use of non-penal institutional supervision of C.O.B. offenders in Canada, although these 
disposals may appear lenient, they are in fact punitive because they subject women to 
“extensive moral regulation”, in that the offender is expected to meet the ideal norms of 
femininity prior to release.142   
 
Finally, it is worth noting that in the Irish Free State institutional disposals were 
not reserved for women convicted of serious offences, or, in particular, offences of a 
“sexually immoral” nature. The records considered in the Magdalen Report indicate that 
the Irish courts used the Magdalen institutions (and presumably other willing religious 
institutions) as a sentencing option for a range of offences, most of which were petty in 
nature, and which, in some instances, appear to have had no overt “sexual” or “immoral” 
undertone, including for example larceny.143 This may suggest that all female criminality 
was thought to offend against the idealised standards of femininity and as such required a 
particular response which was geared towards addressing the offender’s socially deviant 
behaviour, as well as her criminal conduct.  It could equally be argued, however, that since 
convent disposals do not seem to have been reserved for crimes which had clear moral 
connotations, such as for example, prostitution and infanticide offences, this indicates that 
other factors may have affected judicial sentencing decisions. This is explored further in the 
following section.   
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VI - The Urge to Protect: The Vulnerability of Women and the “Semi-Penal” 
Institution 
 
In addition to the possibility of rehabilitation/reform, judges may have also been 
concerned about the related matter of preventing young women and girls who had not 
previously been in contact with the law from further criminalisation through imprisonment.   
Most women prisoners had been incarcerated for offences related to prostitution, 
drunkenness, begging, loitering, vagrancy, and stealing,144 and there were very high rates 
of recidivism among this population. This was due, in part, to the difficulty female prisoners 
had in re-establishing themselves in society on release.145 Thus, prisons were possibly 
considered unsuitable as places of confinement for certain kinds of female offenders, 
particularly the young woman who had not previously been in contact with the criminal 
law. The disadvantages of imprisonment for young female offenders are highlighted in the 
following extract from a memorandum written by a female probation officer in 1941:  
 
there is little advantage to the State in sentencing a girl to a term of imprisonment 
under our existing system…. Perhaps the greatest disadvantage of the system is 
that young girls … are able to meet and converse with hardened offenders ‘doing 
time’, whose vile influence is seen in the changed attitude of the newcomer, even 
after a few days…. I have not yet found a first offender really benefiting from a 
prison sentence but on the contrary have seen many young girls become embittered, 
hardened and morally decadent as the result of association with the depraved 
characters who form the normal population of our prisons. Moreover, this first term 
of imprisonment, especially if a short one, is usually the prelude to many another 
and soon the girl becomes an ‘incorrigible type.’146 
 
Thus, a term of imprisonment would expose the first-time offender, not only to 
stigmatisation, but also to potential criminalisation and further moral decline through 
contact with habitual criminals.  In light of this, it seems that the desire to protect women 
from harmful influences in prisons, while exposing them to the perceived positive effects of 
religious institutionalisation, may have influenced decisions to send Irish women convicted 
of infanticide-related offences to convents. In other words, judges may have sought a more 
effective means of dealing with this offender and convents were possibly viewed as the less 
stigmatising and criminalising option.147 In 1924, Devane argued for the establishment of a 
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female Borstal for young offenders aged 16 to 21 in order to avoid their exposure to the 
harmful influence of prisoners.148  It seems that in the absence of other suitable provision 
judges relied on convents and other similar institutions to fill the gap in the state’s penal 
infrastructure.149  
 
Similar to the apparent overlap between rehabilitation and moral reform, the desire 
to prevent criminalisation also seems to coincide with ideological considerations, such as 
protecting vulnerable women and girls against moral corruption. Gray and Ryan have 
noted that the gender ideologies of the Irish Free State also “included notions of women’s 
vulnerability and need for protection.”150  In this regard, Barton, referring to perceptions of 
women in late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century Britain, states: “[w]omen were seen 
as both corrupting and corruptible beings, capable of asserting influences over others whilst 
simultaneously being susceptible to influence from others.”151 This perceived vulnerability 
to influence, both good and bad, made women “unsuitable for prisons for fear of their 
further corruption”,152 but rendered them amenable to another form of institutionalisation 
which would subject them to a “process of reformation and ‘normalisation’ … in order that 
they might eventually return to society where they could appropriately fulfil their domestic 
and feminine duties”.153 A number of “semi-penal” institutions, such as homes and refuges 
which admitted both criminal and non-criminal women, developed during this period.154 
Weiner notes that these private institutions, “developed to supplement and in part replace” 
the state’s prisons and jails,155 constituting “alternatives to, and preventatives of, 
imprisonment”.156  
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In the Irish Free State, particular ideological concerns may have arisen in 
connection with protecting women who had been convicted of infanticide offences from the 
corrupting influence of imprisonment.  One rationale for intervention in the form of 
institutionalisation and segregation of young, first-time, unmarried mothers who were 
amenable to reform was to prevent them falling into a life of prostitution.157 Given the 
number of prostitutes in prison,158 there may have been similar considerations involved in 
the decision to send unmarried mothers who killed their infants to convents. Indeed, 
Devane in his writings, as well as several professional and philanthropic female witnesses 
before the Carrigan Committee of 1930, including a representative of the Probation Service, 
suggested that young prostitutes who were amenable to reform should be given suspended 
sentences if they agreed to a condition of institutional residence.159 It is plausible that 
similar attitudes informed judicial decision-making when dealing with infanticide offenders, 
and also, possibly, other young female offenders perceived as vulnerable to criminalisation 
and moral corruption in the prison setting.  
 
It has also been noted that women who were perceived to be immoral, particularly 
prostitutes and those who had more than one illegitimate pregnancy, were considered 
mentally deficient by the official authorities.160 Luddy notes that the perception that 
immoral women were feeble-minded lent justification to the policy of institutionalisation for 
the purpose of protecting them against themselves, as well as others.161  Smith found that 
many women appearing before the courts on infant-murder charges were diagnosed as 
being mentally deficient in prison medical reports.162  Certainly, if infanticide offenders were 
thought by judges to be mentally deficient, this may also partly explain why detention at a 
religious institution, rather than immediate release into the community or a prison 
sentence, was preferred.163 Convents may have presented a more effective method of 
disposing of women who were vulnerable to harmful influences in prisons or who were 
thought to require protection, not only against others, but against themselves.  
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VII - Pragmatic Considerations 
 
Aside from considerations about the effectiveness of imprisonment, other pragmatic 
matters may have informed judicial decisions on sentencing of women in infanticide cases. It 
seems likely that limitations in the state’s penal infrastructure were a significant factor in 
judicial sentencing decisions. As noted, resource constraints in connection with ordinary 
custodial options, notably in relation to the fact that there was no female borstal and that 
fact that prisons did not seem to offer the opportunity for rehabilitation, probably led judges 
to favour probation with an institutional requirement over imprisonment for young female 
offenders.164 Certainly, it was cheaper for the state to send women offenders to convent 
institutions.165 By relying on the infrastructure, personnel, and other resources of these 
convents, the state did not have to provide its own facilities.166 Further, due to the very 
basic nature of the probation service in Ireland at the time, judges were possibly restricted 
in terms of imposing probationary supervision under the P.O.A. 1907.167 In the early 1940s, 
there were only six probation officers to serve the entire twenty-six counties and as a result 
courts relied extensively on voluntary organisations, such as the Legion of Mary, to plug 
the gap in the state’s resources.168 Perhaps, convents and other “fallen women” 
establishments were similarly employed by judges who conditionally discharged women 
convicted of infanticide-related offences as a substitute for or supplement to normal 
probationary supervision.  
 
VIII - The Wider Context: A Uniquely “Irish” Approach to Infanticide? 
 
By sending women convicted of infanticide offences, including manslaughter, to 
religious institutions rather than prisons, Irish judges appear to have taken an alternative 
approach to justice in these cases, one which was less formal in the penal sense and which 
was also possibly influenced by the patriarchal ideologies of the Irish Free State. However, 
the use of what has been termed the “semi-penal” institution as an alternative to prison for 
female offenders is not unique to Ireland.169 Victorian England was similarly influenced by 
patriarchal gender ideologies which demanded chastity of all women and emphasised the 
role of the mother in the married family: the virtuous female was the bulwark against moral 
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and social disorder.170 Women who failed to adhere to these idealised norms were 
considered a significant threat and subject to various forms of regulation, including 
institutional containment.171 The semi-penal institution, falling in the middle of the social 
control continuum because it incorporated both penal and domestic control mechanisms, 
was utilised to reform, feminise, contain, and regulate socially deviant women, as well as 
those convicted of criminal offences.172 Falling outside state control, these establishments 
were often run by religiously motivated individuals and, therefore, were underpinned by 
Christian philosophies,173  “which served to increase the levels of discipline that women were 
subjected to (through the imposition of moral expectations)… .”174  
 
While the use of semi-penal establishments in dealing with morally and criminally 
deviant women began to decrease in England from the 1930s onwards, some of these 
institutions continued to operate in subsequent years.175 For example, one institution, which 
was run by The Church of England Temperance Society with little state interference, 
continued to accept women on probation/recognisances until 1948.176 Further, Barton 
argues, that some features of the semi-penal institution, including the influence of Christian 
values and the use of both informal (domestic) and formal (penal) control mechanisms, 
persisted in later twentieth-century institutions, most notably in the form of female 
probation hostels.177  
 
Specifically, in relation to infanticide offenders, Kramar found that many women 
convicted of C.O.B. in Canada in the 1920s-1940s who were not incarcerated in prisons, 
were subject to other disciplinary measures, which included supervision by institutional 
authorities.178 In post-emancipation Jamaica, from World War I onwards, the courts tended 
to punish young women convicted of C.O.B. by fines or probation; a number of those given 
the latter disposal spent their probationary period in a Salvation Army Girls Home which 
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provided them with domestic training.179 It appears, therefore, that sentencing of women for 
infanticide in the Irish Free State may reflect wider trends in responses to female 
criminality which have been identified elsewhere. This is particularly apparent in relation to 
the use of semi-penal institutions as an alternative to imprisonment and reliance on both 
penal and non-penal social control mechanisms when punishing female offenders. More 
research is needed, however, in order to draw more precise comparisons with what 
happened elsewhere. For example, it would be interesting to consider whether the use of 
semi-penal institutions as a sentencing option for female offenders intensified in post-
independent Ireland and had a more enduring effect.180  
 
IX - Conclusion 
 
This article explores sentencing practice in relation to maternal infanticide in the 
Irish Free State. Every woman in this sample of 124 cases had originally been charged with 
murder, but was convicted of a non-capital offence, usually manslaughter or C.O.B. Overall, 
the evidence in the S.B.C.C.C. indicates that the approach to sentencing of women convicted 
of infanticide-related offences was largely non-custodial: these offenders were rarely 
imprisoned. In this regard, it appears that the criminal justice response to maternal 
infanticide in the Irish Free State was overwhelmingly lenient. The non-custodial approach 
taken appears to reflect infanticide sentencing trends elsewhere during the same period, 
notably in England. However, the Irish approach to sentencing for infanticide was not 
strictly non-carceral in nature. Indeed, around 60% of women in this sample entered a 
recognisance, either as part of a suspended sentence, a conditional discharge, or a bind-over, 
to reside at a religious institution, usually for a period of between one and two years. The 
regimes inside these institutions were harsh, and women would have been subject to 
constant discipline and regulation, which may have intensified in the religious and moral 
environment of at least some of the establishments used. Undoubtedly, therefore, the effect 
of institutionalisation was punitive. However, given the nature of the offending involved, it 
may be difficult to conclude that on the whole the response to this offender was unduly 
harsh, even where she was bound to reside at a religious institution for a period of one to 
two years. 
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The key issues explored in this article are judicial understandings of sentencing 
practice and the possible influence of ideological and other factors on sentencing. On the 
basis of research to date, including that undertaken in this study, it is not possible to 
determine judicial perceptions with respect to the punitiveness or otherwise of institutional 
disposals; nor, is it possible to establish with any degree of certainty what factors influenced 
judges in their sentencing decisions in infanticide cases. Since Magdalen asylums and other 
homes had originally been established with protective and welfare agendas in mind,181 
judges may have viewed the institutional disposal as being the more lenient option. Indeed, 
though clearly involving an element of punishment because the offender was detained in an 
environment where she was subject to constant supervision and regulation, it is possible 
that the convent disposal was viewed as a lenient option, particularly in light of the 
ostensibly rehabilitative purpose of conditional discharges, and, suspended sentences.  From 
a criminal justice perspective a recognisance, which rested on the consent of the offender, 
would probably not have been viewed as an unduly punitive measure. Of course, as has been 
noted, in reality an institutional disposal may not have been a particularly lenient sentence 
in terms of its impact on the offender.  
 
As has been argued by other scholars, the use of convent disposals suggests that 
patriarchal ideologies, particularly those relating to sexual deviance in women, had an 
impact on the criminal justice response to infanticide.182 For example, the use of convents, 
and more rarely disposals involving marriage and parental supervision, indicates that the 
courts may have been concerned with controlling the offender’s unacceptable sexuality.183 
Notions of reforming sexually deviant women may have also played a part; whether judges 
also sought to punish the woman for her sexual transgression is less clear.  Indeed, 
assuming ideological factors did influence infanticide sentencing decisions, it seems that the 
custom of favouring relatively short institutional residences over imprisonment was most 
likely inspired by paternalistic notions of reform, protection, and prevention, rather than a 
desire to punish the offender’s supposed sexual deviance.  
 
It should not be assumed, however, that because judges sent infanticide offenders to 
convents that this was necessarily due to the influence of patriarchal ideology. Pragmatic 
issues connected with the penal resources available, as well as particular criminal justice 
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considerations, such as rehabilitation and concerns about recidivism, were probably 
significant factors in judicial decisions on punishment for infanticide.  Although this author 
does not seek to deny that patriarchal ideology played a part, it is notable that notions 
about the reform and protection of sexually immoral women correspond with pragmatic and 
philosophical sentencing objectives, namely rehabilitation and preventing further 
criminalisation. For example, concerns about the effectiveness of imprisonment, particularly 
in light of the risks of stigmatisation and criminalisation, overlap with ideological notions 
about the need to protect vulnerable girls in danger of moral corruption. Arguably, then, 
although the focus within the institutions may have been entirely on religious instruction, 
judges may not have been particularly interested in the spiritual reform of the offender. 
Indeed, sentencers may have been more concerned about preventing recidivism by offering 
an opportunity for rehabilitation within an institutional setting, while protecting the 
offender from the criminalising impact of imprisonment. Due to resource constraints, 
however, judges motivated by such considerations would have had little option but to rely 
on non-state institutions which tended to focus on the more spiritual aspects of reform.  
The fact that religious establishments, such as the Magdalen asylums, also seem to have 
been used as places of detention for women convicted of offences which had no obvious 
connection to sexual immorality, suggests that judges may have been more concerned with 
the pragmatic benefits in terms of preventing recidivism that these institutions appeared to 
offer.  
 
However, for offences like infanticide which had an ostensible connection to sexual 
immorality, the prevention of further reoffending through rehabilitation and the avoidance 
of the criminalising impact of imprisonment may have also been linked to notions about 
morally reforming the offender and protecting her against further moral corruption. Thus, 
judges may have been influenced both by patriarchal ideology and more pragmatic 
sentencing considerations. However, more research is needed before positive conclusions 
can be drawn about the influence of gender ideology and other factors on sentencing of 
women convicted of infanticide-related offences.   For example, it would be important to 
understand wider sentencing practice in relation to both male and female offenders, and 
particularly first-time and young offenders convicted of offences of comparable seriousness, 
in order to draw more valid conclusions about the impact of patriarchal ideology on the 
treatment of infanticide offenders.  
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The use of what have been termed “semi-penal” institutions in sentencing female 
offenders is not a phenomenon unique to the Irish Free State. Similar institutions have also 
been used elsewhere as alternatives to imprisonment for female offenders. Semi-penal 
establishments, which often operated under a religious ethos, served myriad objectives 
including punishment, reform, protection, containment, and “feminisation” of both 
criminally and socially deviant women. In the context of sentencing, the semi-penal 
institution may appear to be a more lenient disposal than imprisonment, and, as noted, 
institutional disposals were probably mainly employed for laudable motives connected with 
rehabilitation/reform and protection/prevention. However, as noted, sentencing disposals 
which appear lenient may be more punitive than intended, particularly where the moral and 
religious environment of the institution subjects the offender to more intensive control and 
discipline, and where the focus of the reforming impulse within the institution is on “re-
feminising” the offender.  
 
Further research is needed in order to draw better comparisons between Ireland and 
other jurisdictions in relation to the use of semi-penal institutions for sentencing women 
convicted of infanticide-related offences, and indeed other female offenders, during the early 
to mid-twentieth century. Possibly the use of these institutions intensified in post-
independent Ireland and Irish courts may have continued to rely on them as alternatives to 
imprisonment for a longer period than their counterparts elsewhere. However, as noted, it 
is not clear whether the use of the semi-penal institution as an alternative to imprisonment 
for certain female offenders was a result of the Irish Free State’s patriarchal gender 
ideologies or whether it was due to practical imperatives, though both sets of factors may 
have played a part.   
